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ABSTRACT
This paper exposits the modern theory of equalizing differences,
viewed as optimal assignments of workers to jobs. The basic ideas are
first illustrated in a simple model with binary choices of work attributes.
Multinominaichoices are briefly considered after that. Empirical implica-
tions are stressed, with special emphasis on elements of selectivity and
stratification by tastes and technology. Applications are sketched f or
certain aspects of the economics of discrimination, human capital, the
value of safety and the theory of implicit contracts. Issues raised by
assignment stratification according to worker traits and productivities
are discussed, and the principle sorting model by comparative advantage
is outlined. The implied valuation system on personal traits andits
relationship to factor-analytic models, as well as selectivity issues in
educational and occupational choice illustrate this aspect of the
theory.
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This paper elaborates variations on some themes of Adam Smith,
particularly those in the first ten chapters of the Wealth of Nations.
Those chapters are without parallel in economics and
still define research frontier subjects in economics today. In reading
those chapters one is struck by the timeless importance of the subject
matter, by the quality of Smith's writing and the clarity of his exposition,
and by the great scope and depth of his ideas. Two central themes stand out:
The first and most important for economic analysis as a whole is
the discussion of gains from trade due to specialization and division of
labor. Specialization exploits scale economies which multiply the fruits
of labor resources. The resulting division of labor provides the basis
for mutually advantageous exchanges of goods and services among economic
agents. This is the sine q.ua non of decentralized competitive market
organization, and is of course fundamental to the main theme of the work
as a whole. It has been the main intellectual preoccupation of economists
ever since. While the limitations of decentralized market allocation
mechanisms are now well understood, there is small irony in the fact that
Smith's own argument rests on scale economies that are not entirely con-
sistent with competitive market organization of economic activities.
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The second theme, and the one we will be most occupied with here,
is the celebrated theory of equalizing differences. This is the basic
equilibrimn theory in labor economics. It rests on the proposition that
wages paid to various types of labor and under various circumstances must
equalize total advantages, both pecuniary and nonpecuniary, among them.
It is interesting, but would take us too far afield, to track the fortunes
of this theory over the years. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that
the institutional approach to labor economics, which itself dominated the
subject for most of its life, was far more concerned with anomolies and
noncompeting group qualifications of Mill and Cairnes than with Smith's
contributions themselves. Indeed, the theory of equalizing differences,
which is fundamentally a theory of spatial equilibrium, found much greater
direct use in agriculatural and urban economics, stemming from its develop-
ment to those fields by von Thunen. There is no question, however, that
whatever its status in the past, Smith's theory rests securely at the center
of modern labor economics. His analysis of professional income was the
first rigorous theory of human capital. His treatment of the influence
of random fluctuations in income on occupational choice is closely related
to the modern theory of implicit contracts. His treatment of consumption
elements of work environments is essential for empirical understanding of
the structure of wages. The work even contains a nascent statement of the
principal and agent problem! The theory of labor supply, production theory,
and some elements of economic dethography are the only subjects of inquiry
that are missing from Smith's treatment.
What follows is an analytical sketch of the theory of equalizing
differences and some of its applications. These applications hardly are3
exhaustive, but rather illustrate the approach from studies in which I have
had a hand and ....mostfamiliar with. I hope they convey the
power, simplicity, and practical value of the theory. The basic model
is sketched in Section II. It takes off on the treatment contained in
Friedman and Kuznets, Income from Independent Professional Practice, but
gives a more complete account of the nature of equilibrium and some of its
implications. Section III outlines some applications. These include
elements of the economics of discrimination; human capital; imputations of
the value of work safety and the valuation of life in risk—benefit analysis;
and the nature of implicit contracts and income risk. Section IV extends
the model to valuations of personal traits and specific skills rather than
job and work—environment characteristics. This. is necessarily incomplete
because several conceptual problems have not been resolved at this date.
Implications for income distribution, and selectivity bias in occupational
and educational choice are the examples chosen to illustrate these aspects
of the theory.
II. Th.e Theory of Equalizing Differences
The theory of equalizing differences is fundamentally a theory of
valuation of job attributes. In this account I specialize the job attrib.ute
to a consumption item, so the problem is basically one of a tie—in in which.
the worker sells the services of his labor but simultaneously purchases
the characteristics of his job, viewed as on—the—job consumption. In this
model work attributes are fixed for a given work situation, but vary from
job to job. The basic problem is to match each worker's preferences for
on—the—job consumption versus market consumption to the proper work
attribute; that is to say, to assign each worker to a firm which offers4
the desired job characteristics. A twin choice problem must be addressed:
wärkers choose among job attributes by working for firms that offer the
desired amounts; and firmschoosewhich job attributes to offer. A
competitive price mechanism guides these choices and takes the form of
wage differentials ——equalizingdifferences ——onjobs with different
attributes. The tie—in nature of attribute transactions makes clear that
the problem is basically one of spatial equilibrium, assignment, and sorting.
Most of the basic ideas are illustrated in the simplest possible
case. Consider a job characteristic D which is discrete and binary: D
takes on two values, say 0 or 1. To be specific, suppose D indexes a dis—
amenity such as airborne particulates at the workplace. Hence a job is
either "dirty," in which case D =1(some particulates); or it is clean
(no particulates), in which case D =0.We simplify further by assuming
that all workers are alike in terms of their basic underlying skills (this
assumption will be relaxed later) and that the job attribute D does not
In and of itself dIrectly affect any worker's productIvity. This means
that D, or its absence, is a pure consumption good from a worker's point
of view. Allowing for direct productivity interactions complicates
the analysis, but does not affect the main conclusions. In these circum-
stances there must be two possible wages in the market: W1 for jobs
characterized by D =1and W0 for jobs characterized by D0. The
wage differential between them is the equalizing difference.
A. Worker Choice and Supply
A worker chooses the value of D that maximizes utility subject to
a budget constraint. Preferences are described by a utility function
uU(C,D) defined over market consumption goods C and job consumption5
goods (attributes) D. As usual, U(C,D) represents the internal trade—off s
between C and D that the worker would find acceptable. Since we are here
interpreting D as a disamenity (a "bad" rather than a "good"), the map of
U(C,D) in the C,D plane has convex indifference curves that are positively
inclined rather than negatively inclined as in the standard case. (It is
always possible to convert a disamenity problem into an amenity by an
appropriate change in scale, e.g., consider the cleanliness of a job rather
than its dirtiness, but the result is the same in either case.) In deciding
on the choice of job D, the worker contemplates the fact that his labor
services are exchanged for money which buys market consumption goods and
that D is an undesirable by—product of the work environment chosen. It is
clear that if the worker dislikes larger values of D, compensation in the
form of additional market consumption is necessary for him to voluntarily
choose it compared to a job with a smaller value of D. This is the counnon
sense of the idea of equalizing differences. Preferences alone therefore
predict that W. Still, we are interested in the determinantsof how
large the difference between and might be and also what can be
inferred from wage—attribute data.
WhenDis binary, the budget constraint reduces to two points.1
Since C =
W1,for i =0,1, the available consumption possibilities in the
(.C,D) plane are (W1,l) and (W0,O). The worker chooses the point, and
therefore the value of D, which lies on the highest indifference curve.
Consequently, the choice is D =1if TJ(W1,l)>U(W0,0) and is D =0if the
inequality is reversed. The worker is indifferent between the two jobs
if U(W1,l) =U(W0,0).
In fact, given W0 it is6
possible to find a that would equalize utility between D =1and D =0.
That value of W1 compared with is known as the reservation price. It
represents the equalizing difference for that particular worker. There-
fore an equivalent description of the solution to the worker's choice
problem is to compare the actual, available market wage difference
between the two jobs with this reservation price. If the difference in
market wages exceeds the reservation wage, the worker chooses D1
because the additional market goods available from that choice more than
compensates for the additional disagreeableness of the job. Similarly,
the worker chooses D =0if the market wage differential is less than
the reservation price.
To illustrate, suppose preferences are described by a one para-
meter family of curves u =Ce.The parameter p is a measure of the
worker's distaste for D. The larger is p the greater the additional
market compensation necessary to bribe the worker to undertake a job
with a larger value of D. To analyze the choice problem, form an index
function defined by I =logU(W1,l)/tJ(W0,O) =log(W1/W0) —p.The
reservation wage is defined as the value of (W1/W0) that sets I =0.
Define the reservation wage as R. Then substituting into the above
yields R =e,which is an increasing function of p. The worker chooses
D =1if I >0,or equivalently, if (W1/W0) >e.D =0is chosen if I <0,
of if (W1/W0) <e.Choice is made by a random device if (W1/W0) =e.
Aggregation over worker choices is required to describemarket
supply conditions to each type of job. In the example given, aworker is
completely characterized by the taste parameter p. Differentworkers might7
have different preferences, and that is conveniently described by a
distribution function over all workers. Denote that distribution by
g(p)dp, which is readily transformed into a distribution of R, say
h(R)dR. Since all workers for whom B. <
(W1/W0)choose D =1,the
supply function of workers to jobs of type 1 must be the sum
(1) N =fh(R)dR
The supply to jobs for which D =0is just the rest of the distribution,
the integral of h(R) from W1/W0 to the largest value of B..
Expressed in this way it is apparent that the market assignment
of workers to job characteristics neatly partitions the distribu—
tion of tastes into two parts. The situation is illustrated in Figure 1.
Consider a given market wage ratio (W1/W0) marked by the heavy vertical
line in the figure. Then by the choice rule set forth above, the area
under the distribution h() to the left of W1/W0 is N, the number who
supply their labor to dirty work. Similarly, the area in the right tail
of the distribution is the number who supply their labor to clean jobs.
The figure clearly shows that were, say (W1/W0) to increase, those people
who were close to the margin of indifference at the old wage ratio would
switch over and choose D =1rather than D =0.Therefore, the supply
curve of workers to dirty jobs is increasing in (W1/w0) and literally
sweeps out the transformed distribution of preferences for D as captured
in h(R).
Were it possible to econometrically identify and estimate supply
curve (1) or its counterpart N, it would be straightforward to impute the8
entire underlying distribution of preferences h(R) or g(p), conditional
of course on the assumed form of the underlying utility function. How-
ever, it is usually not possible to do that because of data limitations.
At this point most studies must rest content with estimating the
equilibrium wage differential (W11W0) in a cross section, itself not a
trivial task. This identifies only one point on the distribution h(R),
but still provides some information on the conditional first
moments of h(R) or g(p).
Consider the distribution of K in Figure 1 conditional on D =1
having been chosen. Then we know from the definition of a conditional
expectation that the average value of K (and therefore of p) for those
who choose D =1must be less than the observed value of (W1/W0). It
also must be less than or equal to the unconditional expectation of R in
the entire population. That is to say, the observed value of lôg(W1/W0)
is an upper bound estimate of the conditional mean of p for D =1.By a
parallel argument, it is a lower bound estimate of the conditional mean
value of p for those who choose D =0.If we have prior information that
the variance of h(K) is small, if individuals have very similar tastes,
then the estimated value of tells us much more about those tastes
than if the variance is large. If we furthermore have reason to believe
that most workers do not work on D =1jobs so that N is a small fraction
of available workers in the market, then we can confidently predict that
the observed value of log (w1/W) is a lower bound on the average value
of p in the population as a whole. While not providing complete informa-
tion about preferences, these inequalities are very useful in many practical
applications of the theory. Note that the choice rule and market assignment9
in Figure 1 sorts people to jobs in a systematic way and that the people
who are observed in each category form a censored sample of the population
as a whole. This is perhaps the most simple and fundamental example of
selectivity in labor economics. It should be apparent that it is a
very general implication of the theory of revealed preference and applies to
virtually all economic choices. Another way of saying this is that there
are economic rents inherent in these choices, since most people who make
a given choice would continue to make it even if wages were somewhat
different. It is only when all persons have the same tastes that rents
disappear and that observed wages index the equalizing difference for the
whole population, for the average person in the market as well as for the
marginal one.
B. Firm Choice and Demand
If most workers dislike D we know from the analysis above that
generally must exceed W0. But higher wages on D =1jobs must be supported
somehow and what sustains them must be larger productivity among firms who
find it optimal to offer that kind of work. Clearly if that was not the
case we would never observe any jobs for which D =1.All jobs would
offer D =0and would be preferred by everyone. Hence we conclude that in
some general sense attributes that are disamenable must be productive.
It does not follow though that job attributes which are amenable mustbe
counterproductive. Rather, if the two coexist, disamenities must exhibit
a productivity advantage to the firms that offer them. This is thebasis
for ascertaining which types of jobs a given firm chooses to supply to
the labor market. For this purpose, and analogous to its role inworkers'10
utility functions, D must enter as an argument into a firm's production
function. The choice of D is then made by comparing the enhanced productivity
of a given labor force when D =1with the additional cost of labor due to
the fact that W1 rather than W0 must be paid to each worker. If the addi-
tional value of productivity is larger than the additional wage bill the
firm chooses D1; while, if the productivity effect is small, dirty work
does not generate sufficient revenue to cover the extra labor costs, and
the firm cleans up its technology. It installs ventilation equipment and
uses other resources for cleaning up its environment and offers D =0.
To illustrate this in the simplest possible way, consider a fixed
coefficient technology with production function x =c1n
if D =1and
x =
ct0nif D =0.Here x is output, n is labor input, and are fixed
coefficients with l > a0. The last condition reflects the fact that
productivity is larger if D =1is chosen, that some otherwise productive
labor must be used up in the cleaning process if D =0were chosen instead.
With this technology unit cost is W1/ct, for i =1,0.The firm chooses




(W1/W0)(a01a1) (W1/W0)(l/). Then D =1or 0
as 1* < 1 or as (W11W0) .If1* < 1 the productivity effect outweighs
the added labor cost; and if I > 1 added productivity is insufficiently
large to compensate for added labor costs. In this case we have that is
itself the firm's reservation wage ratio, the firm's equalizing difference.
If the market wage ratio happens to equal 13thefirm is indifferent about
its choice of D.
To obtain the market demand for workers in type D1 jobs it is
necessary to aggregate among firms that choose to offer them: Suppose firms11
differ in their technology ratioand that f(8)d describes the distri-
bution ofamong firms. Then since >
(W/W0)
describes firms who choose
D =1,the nwnber of such workers demanded is2
(2) N= f
Thepartition of firms among D1 and D0 is displayed in Figure 2.
Equation (2) defines a curveinthe N,(W1/W2) plane that is negatively
inclined. Now all those to the right of the heavy vertical line choose
D1 and all those to the left choose D0. As (W1/w0) falls the market
demand sweeps out the distribution ofamong firms from right to left and
the demand for workers in dirty jobs increases. The same arguments about
conditional moments as in Figure 1 apply to this distribution and will not
be repeated. Suffice it to say that a single observed value of the market
wage ratio measures the equalizing difference for firms on the margin of
choice only and marginal and average firms depart in systematic ways unless
all firms have the same technologies.
It is conmion in economics today to maintain the assumption that all
firms in a given industry have access to the same technology, so some
connuent on the rationale for a nondegenerate distribution of is warranted.
The most important point is that the construction in Figure 2 is not
necessarily confined to a given industry. Variance inis produced by
interindustry differences in technologies. Some production processes are
inherently dirtier than others. While there is no technology that cannot
use resources to clean up its work environment, it is undoubtedly more
costly to do so in some industries than in others; e.g., think of coal12
mining versus insurance. The second point is that there is nothing sacred
about the assumption of identical technologies in a given industry, though
it is sometimes convenient. Indeed, many aspects of firms, such as dif-
ferences in their size in the same industry, are simply not consistent with
identical technologies. Whatever firm—specific factors cause these differences
may well interact in nonseparable ways with job attribute—output tradeoffs,
even in the same industry.
C. Market Equilibrium
The joint solution to market supply and demand functions (1) and (2)
determines the wage ratio (W1/w0) that is observed in the market.3 Since
supply price is increasing and demand price is decreasing, an equilibrium
in which some workers are observed in both types of jobs must be unique,
if it exists. The equilibrium wage ratio is determined so that the parti-
tions in Figures 1 and 2 are conformable, so that all workers seeking D1
jobs are able to find them and all firms seeking workers on such jobs can
fill them. It is interesting to note that the equilibrium assignment of
workers to firms exhibits a negative assortive matching property. Workers
with lower than average values of p are matched to firms with higher than
average values of .Workerswho have the least distaste for the disamenity
work in firms for whom the disamenity Is the most productive. The equilibrium
assignment matches the proper worker type to the proper firm type, analogous
to a marriage market. This kind of allocation is characteristic of all
spatial equilibrium problems, but the question of who works for whom is
especially important in the labor market. Finally, it is also obvious that
the equilibrium assignments and choices are Pareto optimal when information
is complete.13
D. Generalization
While binary choices takes us a long way toward understanding
the issues raised by equalizing differences and what can be inferred
from the data, it remains true that most job attributes exhibit much
more variation. Thus to continue along with the problem above, jobs
differ greatly in the degree of cleanliness offered. A straightforward
generalization of the model is to consider multinomia]. choice rather
than binary choice. I used the index function approach to suggest a
probit analog: more choices would require a multinomial probit or
logit approach. Thus let D take on k possible values, with k ? 2.
Since D is ordered, let larger values of k index correspondingly large
values of D. Then k distinct markets must be considered. The competi-
tive wage in the kth market is Wk and the budget constraint for a worker
is represented by k distinct points (W.D) for j =1,2, ...,k.
The worker chooses that value of j which maximizes utility. While
conceptually straightforward the problem is difficult to analyze for
general utility functions because a computational algorithm that makes
pairwise comparisons between all possiblechoices is required. It is
easy to see that the optimal choice depends not only on local curvature
properties of preferences, but on global curvature as well. Nonetheless,
it is clear that the ordering property of the optimal assignment by tastes
and relative costs shown in Figures 1 and 2 are more or less preserved.
Thus withsuitably regular parameterizations of preferences, the
distributions are partitioned into at most k ordered regions. Workers
with the largest values of p are assigned to the smallest values of j and14
firms whose cleaning costs are largest are assigned to the largest values
of j:. The negative assortive matching feature of market equilibrium is
thereby generalized.
A marginal analysis serves to illustrate this very nicely when k
is so large and D is sufficiently divisible that there are an infinite
number of choices for all practical purposes Then D may be represented
as a continuous variate, measured say in parts per million particulates.
There remains a wage associated with every value of D, so now income
possibilities for a worker are represented by a continuous function W(D),
which is nondecreasing if D is a disamenity. The worker maximizes
utility subject to C =W(D):therefore D is chosen to maximize uU(W(D),D).
A maximum is characterized by the marginal condition =W'(D). Here
UD/UC is the marginal rate of substitution between D and consumption goods
and is negative if D is disamenable. Notice the slight variance from a
standard constrained maximum problem in that the gradient of W(D) is the
correct (marginal) price in the optImization calculation, not W(D) itself.
Notice also that W(D) need not be linear, so the marginal price W'(D) may
vary with D.The solution is represented •as a proper spatial equilibrium
in Figure 3. The curves labeled and are (C,D) indifference curves
for two different types of workers. Worker 1 exhibits a greater distaste
for D and chooses a smaller value in equilibrium.
A similar development, wherein D shifts production possibilities
rather than tastes, is available for firms. I omit it here. A swmnary
of the solution is also depicted in Figure 3 by profit indifference
curves in the (W,D) plane, labeled and for two different types of
firms. type firms find it easier to provide clean workplaces than15
type firms do and therefore choose to offer smaller amounts of D to the
market. The equilibrium assignment allocates worker taste types to firm
technology types in a systematic manner. That a profit indifference
curve "kisses" a worker's indifference curve at the equilibrium assignment
best summarizes the marriage aspects of the problem solved in the implicit
market for job attributes.
Figure 3 well illustrates the revealed preferences sorting aspects
of the equilibrium assignment and shows what can be inf erred from the observed
wage—attribute schedule W(D). For example, it is apparent that the gradient
W' (D) identifies the marginal rate of substitution only for workers and
firms who happen to choose that particular value of D. Still, when workers
are approximately identical in their preferences then W(D) identifies an
indifference curve and W' (D) measures the marginal rate of substitution all
over the map. Similarly, were firms identical rather than workers, W(D)
would coincide with a profit indifference curve and its gradient function
would closely approximate the marginal cost function for achieving smaller
values of D. When firms and workers are both. heterogeneous, the data are
censored and selected by the optimal assignment. Thus for example, the
difference in wages between and B2 is an underestimate of the equalizing
difference required for type 1 persons —thatis why type its. are located at
rather than at B2; and it is an overestimate for type 2 persons, who
evidently found the wage premium sufficiently large to more than buy—off
their distastes and who chose B2 instead of B1. Rence, if W(D) is
estimated over its upper range, for the largest values of B, it could b.e
confidently predicted that the gradient W' (B) in that range underestimates
the average person's marginal rate of substitution, because theirintrinsic16
distaste for D was much larger, by revealed preference. Comparable state—
mertts can be made about firms.
III. Applications
A. Value of Safety5
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in this topic that
pervades many aspects of environmental legislation, workplace safety regula-
tion, food and drug safety, consumer safety, and so on. It is now well
understood that proper cost/benefit analysis of alternative policies
requires both an estimate of the magnitude of risks involved and some
valuation of the additional safety that might be provided by the policy.
Following general economic practice, the appropriate valuation of risk Is :the
willingness to pay to reduce it. Let V measure this sum for any given
person. It is defined as the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and mortality risk and is sometimes labeled the "value of
life." To motivate that terminology, consider the following conceptual
experiment. Think of a large group of N people who contemplate a project
that would reduce morality risk by 1/N. Then each would be prepared to
pay approximately V/N for the project and they would collectively pay
N(V/N) =V.Since the project reduces mortality by 1/N and N people
are involved, approximately one statistical life is saved; hence these
people are prepared to pay V for one statistical life.
Thoroughgoing analysis of safety has been hampered by lack of
direct measures of valuations V. As is usually the case in economics,
it must be inferred from actual behavior of persons in risky situations.
A basis for inference is provided by the common observation that people
do in fact voluntarily undertake many risks in their everyday lives and17
do so by weighing the perceived costs and benefits of their actions.
Nowhere is this so apparent as in the labor market, where we observe
many jobs with substantial risks to health and longevity that pay
correspondingly large wages. This is a straightforward application of the
theory of equalizing differences: if workers find health risks distasteful,
jobs that involve considerable perceived risks must bribe workers to accept
them by paying a wage premium. The observed wage premium, in conjunction
with the size of the risk therefore provides a possibility for inferring
V from the risk premium.
Consider a worker with von—Neuman—Morgenstern utility (l—q)U(C),
where q is the risk of a job and C is consumption. It is readily verified
that the marginal rate of substitution between q and C is TJ(C)/(l—q)U'(C) V.
Suppose the worker has an opportunity to work in jobs of various risk q
which pay wages W(q), with W'(q) >0.The worker chooses q and C to
maximize expected utility subject to the constraint W(q) =C.Substituting
into the utility function and differentiating with respect to q yields the
marginal condition V =W'(q). Therefore the wage gradient provides an esti-
mate of the marginal value of life V at q. The analysis in Section II
applies virtually intact, with q replacing D ——seeFigure 3. Only if all
workers had the same preferences would it be true that W(q) would cover
a unique indifference curve. More generally, workers have different tastes.
For many reasons some are more risk averse and have higher values of V
than others. Then revealed choices suggest that workers found on riskier
jobs have lower values of V than those who work on safe jobs. However, if
we can find the wage premium on very risky jobs that should serve at least
as a lower bound estimate of the average value of V in the population as a whole.18
Econometric estimates of W(q) are obtained by regression or related
methods. Required data are wage rates, risks workers are exposed to, and
measures of personal characteristics such as schooling, experience, and
other variables that are known to affect wages and which serve as statistical
controls. Two types of risk measures are available for this purpose:
occupational and industry risks. Both are obtained from accident statistics
collected by the federal government and from lifeinsurancecompany records.
They are matched to earnings and related data available from census survey
records. All studies undertaken so far have shown that the empirical
wage—risk gradient is positive and prove the feasiblity of the approach.
Having said that, however, there is far less agreement from study to study
on the magnitude of the gradient and therefore on the size of V. Studies
using occupational risk data provide estimates of V that are systematically
smaller than studies using industrial risk data. The former estimates are
in the vicinity of $500,000 (in 1983 dollars), whereas the latter estimates
range as high as $2N or more. The reason for these substantial differences
in the estimates has not yet been resolved, but probably lies in the crude-
ness of the risk measures available. It is interesting to note that
estimates lnf erred from observed risk choice behavior outside of the market,
such as cigarette smoking, tend to corroborate these figures, wide as
their range may be.
B. Economics of Discrimination
It is in this area that the theory of equalizing differences has
found its earliest and most widespread use. Discrimination is viewed as
arising from tastes or distastes of association with identifiable groups19
in the workplace or other environments. Such preferences, which in some
contexts may be viewed as socially illegitimate, effectively serve to tax
members of despised groups and subsidize members of favored groups.
The theory of tax incidence may then be applied to predict the
distribution and size of wage differentials among workers.6 Since this
theory and the many empirical studies that support it are so well known,
I have chosen a less familiar example drawn from the market for public
school teachers.7 This example is not only interesting In its own
right, but considerably broadens the scope of the theory of equalizing
differences and raises issues that apply to many other labor markets as
well.
We seek to study the implicit valuation of student attributes by
teachers, particularly the racial composition of the student body within
a school. For example, how much additional pay, if any, is required to
entice a white teacher to work in a school with mainly black students?
Answers to questions such as these have obvious relevance for estimating
real educational costs indexes necessary to implement Equal Educational
Opportunity policies. The analytical issues raised by this problem
involve a nontrivial extension of the theory which has much broader
applicabiilty. While teachers may have well defined preferences for
schools and students of various characteristics, it is also true that
schools may well have distinct preferences for various types of teachers
and their attributes. The matching problem is therefore much more
complicated than was indicated in Section II.
Denote school characteristics by the vector S and teacher
characteristics by the vector T. A teacher endowed with a particular20
value of T searches out a school with the desired value of S, given the
wage prospects available. Similarly, a school is endowed with a
particular value of S and searches for teachers with desired characteristics
T because teaching effectiveness may differ among persons with different
traits for .a particular composition of the student body. A match
occurs when desired values Of T and S are conformable with each other.
It is particularly interesting that the matching problem gives rise to
possibilities for trade refusal. A given teacher may desire to work at
a particular school because it offers a preferred wage and student
characteristic configuration. But the school may not be willing to hire
him if he does not possess desirable teaching attributes T relative to
someone else. Similarly, a school may desire to hire a particular teacher,
but may not offer the value of S necessary to attract him. The equilibrium
concept therefore must be extended to cover the joint space (S,T), which
implies that the equilibrium pricing mechanism is defined over both sets
of variables: W(S,T) is the market clearing wage for any feasible S,T
comb mat ion.
A teacher's utility function is defined over market consumption C
and school attributes, as before: u =U(C,S).Choice of S is found by
maximizing U subject to the constraint C W(S,T), given the teacher's
particular value of T, leading to the marginal condition _W3(S,T) =US/UT.
Conditioning the choice on T is necessary for feasibility, given the
definition of W(S,T). Therefore the S subgradient of the observed wage—
attribute function measures the marginal valuation of S for those teachers
who were able to choose it. Revealed preference—selectivity bias
again applies for persons who are not located at that particular margin.21
A school's choice of teachers is made on the basis of the effects
of teacher traits T on educational output, represented in the educational
production function E =F(T,S),where E is educational value—added per
student. Notice that T and S strongly interact in production- if the
effectiveness of a teacher of given traits varies according to the
characteristics of the school and students to which he is assigned.
School administrators serve as agents for parents and choose teachers
with traits that minimize costs given E and S (or equivalently that
maximize£given costs and S). This leads to the marginal condition
WT(S,T) =XFT(T,S),
where X is the marginal cost of £.Thatis, the
school chooses teacher attributes such that their marginal cost is proportional
to their marginal product, all conditional on the studentcharacteristics
that the school is endowed with. Therefore the T—subgradientof the
observed wage—attributes function estimates marginal productivityof T
for schools who were able to hire those persons. The selectivitybias
argument again applies to schools who are located at yetother margins.
Empirical work on this problem has concentrated on estimatingthe
function W(S,T) in cross—section data. This requires information on wages
paid to teachers, on the student and neighborhoodcharacteristics of the
schools they work in, and productivity attributes of teachers.The basic
unit of observation is a school—teacher pair, and wages of teachers are
regressed on empirical proxies for S and T. Whileseveral such studies
• have been made, the one I am most familiar with used anational random
sample of schools from 1965 survey data. When S issummarized in a
single statistic, the racial composition ofstudents measured by proportion
black, it is found that white teachers prefer toteach in schools with22
mainly black students. The average compensating differential was $6 per
percentage point black students for white teachers (1965 $).Itwas $2 per
percentage point white for black teachers. This suggests that it would be
necessary to compensate a white teacher at least $600 to move from an
all—white school to an all—black school; whereas a black teacher would
need to be compensated at least $200 to move from an all—black school
to an all—white one. Experimentation with other school and student
characteristic variables indicates that these differentials reflect much
more than racial preferences per se. These indicators include measures
of student ability; attendance, truancy and disciplinary problems;
college—going preferences of students; and neighborhood characteristics.
Regression coefficients on these variables typically reveal that teachers
prefer to teach in schools located in more amenable neighborhoods with
more able and better motivatedstudents.8 They are willing to pay someting
for these opportunities in the form of wage reductions. In Mierican society
today it is an unfortunate fact that student racial composition is highly
correlated with these other attributes of students and schools. The
correlation is sufficiently large that it is not possible to disentangle
the separate influences of each dimension of S. An index on the entire
vector is the best that can be done to summarize the data, because schools
are very strongly stratified by race and other school—studentattributes.
Nonetheless, the sorting implications of the basic model were strongly
confirmed. The average white teacher in this sample required additional
compensation of more than $400 to teach in schools with the characteristics
of the average black teacher. Similarly, the average black teacher
required additional compensation of at least $300 to work inschools with23
the average characteristics of those in which white teachers were found.
C. Human Capital
The theory of human capital has been very important to labor
economics in the last two decades.Its implications for the distribution
of income and inequality in economic life are profound. The major outline
of the subject is readily found in the Wealth of Nations, when Smith notes
that occupations requiring time and money expenditures on training must pay
larger wages to compensate both for that expense and for the brieferdura-
tion of labor market productivity implied by it. As is now well known,
observed earnings differentials between schooling levels provides a basis
for imputing rates of return to education. However, these concepts have
much greater generality to learning opportunities and skill acquisition
in the labor market as well as to the analysis of education per se. It
is these largely informal, learning—by—doing aspects on which the following
account focuses..
It is a common observation that most specific job skills arelearned
from work activities themselves. Formal schooling paves the way, both by
setting down a body of general knowledge and principles aswell as teaching
students how to learn. But even in the case of professional trainingthere
is no perfect substitute for apprenticeship, that is, for work experience
itself. These ideas can be captured in the followingway.9 Think of a
job as a tied package of work and learning: aworker simultaneously sells
the services of his skills and jointly buys the opportunity to augmentthese
skills. Learning potential is a by—product of the work environmentitself.
It is tied to a specific work activity but varies from activityto activity24
and from job to job. Some provide more learning opportunities and some
provide less. Therein lies a margin of choice, for both workers and
firms.
As is generally known, a worker's incentives for capital accumula—
tion (learning) are largest at young ages. Hence young workers are
typically assigned to those jobs and work activities for which learning
potential is largest. The optimal human capital investment program is
implemented by a sequence of assignments in which workers systematically
move across work activities and jobs that offer successively smaller
learning opportunities. Thus, the optimal program implies a systematic
pattern of job mobility and "promotions" with experience. Firms accommodate
this by structuring work activities in various ways to provide greater or
smaller learning options. While some learning invariably is jointly supplied
with all work activity, prospects for altering learning potential arises
from reallocating experienced workers' time away from direct production
and toward instructing inexperienced personnel. This is costly, because
marketable output is foregone. Thus, a firm can be viewed as jointly
producing both marketable output and training output, summarized by
a production possibilities frontier between the two. Training services are
directly sold to existing employees. These sales are implicit in wage
reductions of workers who undertake training. In this case the equalizing
differential is defined over the learning opportunity connected with
some activity.
To see what this implies, index the training potential of a work
activity by a latent variable I. Let p(I) represent the market equalizing25
difference, with P increasing in I and P(O)0. P is the foregone
earnings paid by a worker if assigned to activity I. Let the worker be
endowed with skill k, which rents for unit price R. Then the worker's
observed earnings are y and y =BK—P(I).This illustrates the tie—in.
The worker sells services of value Bk but buys back a learningopportunity
worth P(I), The worker demands learning opportunities because they
enhance future skills and rewards. The model is closed by specifying a
relationship between the effect of choice of i on=dk/dt.This techno-
logical constraint is l =g(I),where g is an increasing function. In-
verting g, expressing I as a function of l and substituting into the
definition of earnings yields y =Bk—G(1),where G is an increasing.
convex function. The worker chooses a time valued function 1(t) and
therefore k(t) to maximize the present value of earnings over working
life. The economics of the choice problem is illustrated in Figure 4.
The smooth curve shown as an envelope is the function y =Bk—G()
conditioned on the current value of k. The step functions that this
curve envelopes represent alternative learning opportunities I, with
I increasing asincreases and which cost more in terms of P(I). Choice
of a larger value of I is costly because current income falls. The potential
return is a larger value of k in the future which shifts income—investment
opportunity locus upward and to the right and expands future choices.
For example, consider a simple case where i =yl,with y interpreted
as a learning efficiency parameter; and where P(I) is a simple quadratic,
P(I) —12/2.Then y(t) =Rk(t)
—[k(t)/y]2/2.The discounted value of
humanwealthis Iy(t)e_rtdt,where N is the leng.th of working life and.
0
r is the discount rate. In this s-ixple case the program that maximizes26
human wealth (subject to an initial stock k(O) =
k0)equates marginal cost
of investment to its marginal return. Marginal cost is simply the slope
of the income—investment possibilities curve in Figure 4, or (t)/y2 in
this case. The discounted marginal return of a unit of skill is the
rental that will be obtained from it over its useful life. At time t
this is nothing other than (RJr)(l —et))=Q(t),the present value
of an annuity paying R for (N—t) periods. Notice that Q(t) is decreasing
2
and concave in t. Along the optimum trajectory we therefore have k =yQ(t):
the worker's rate of learning is largest at young ages and monotonically
falls over the life cycle. The sequence of learning options that implement
the optimal policy is given by 1(t) =yQ(t).Young workers are assigned
to positions with the largest learning opportunities and are successively
promoted to "higher" levels as their skills increase.
An interesting selectivity aspect of this problem arises if y is
thought of as a fixed effect that varies from person to person in the
population. Some persons may be more efficient in converting a given learn-
ing opportunity into useful marketable skills. A more complicated problem
would specify an interaction between learning ability and previously
acquired knowledge, as well as with inherent ability. Whatever the source
of these differences, the formulas above forand I reveal that workers
with larger values of y accumulate more human capital and are assigned to
jobs with greater learning opportunities at each age. Greater learning
efficiency reduces the real price of investment to the more able, and they
purchase greater amounts. This may be an important source of income
inequality in the population as a whole, because human wealth is increasing
in y and observed wage differences are not completely equalizing across the
population at large.27
This theory implies a corresponding theory of promotions within an
organization and possibly a "stepping stone" theory of job mobility among
firms. For example, it is not hard to imagine that some firms might
exhibit comparative advantage in producing learning opportunities. If so,
they would cater mostly to young workers and provide a source of supply
of experienced workers to firms which have relative advantages in other
lines of production. Little empirical work has been done so far along
these lines.10 Instead most empirical studies have concentrated on
observable life cycle earnings. The basis for this is easily seen in
the simple example. If the expression for k and the implied life cycle
trajectory for k is substituted into the definition of y, a closed form
solution for y(t) is obtained. It is easily imagined, and turns out to
be true, that the implied functional form of y(t) provides information on
underlying parameters such as y and r. The few studies that have been
made suggest that workers with more formal schooling are more efficient
learners. They also suggest that their depreciation and obsolescence :rates
on human capital investment are larger than those with less schooling,
implying another obvious source of selection and assignment of workers
among different types of workactivities
D. Implicit Contracts
Recent research on implicit.contracts extends the idea of equalizing
differences to unemployment risk. An implicit contract is a mutual under-
standing between workers and employers in which the firm is givenwide
latitude to make decisions concerning employment and layoff status andhours
of work of its employees at its own discretion and and as circumstances
arise. The agreement is implicit because myriad28
unforeseen contingencies make contracting costs so large that formal con-
tracts are uneconomic. Employers decisions serve their firm's self interest
in any given situation. Were these decisions otherwise unconstrained, they
might involve a degree of worker exploitation. In most analyses sufficient
cotmuon information and potential mobility of workers across firms insures
that an employer's decisions are constrained to achieve a minimal level of
expected utility by its workers; viz., the level expected at other firms.12
Figure 3 still serves as an organizing device for this class of
problems. Assuming that all workers are alike, the equalizing difference
function, defined say on the risk of layoff, maps out the representative
worker's indifference curve, and constrains a firm's choice, which is
described by the usual tangency condition. There is an equivalent dual
representation of the problem. Instead of treating the implicit contract
as maximizing profits subject to a utility constraint, think of the contract
as maximizing worker utility subject to a profit constraint; in fact
with free entry of firms, profit is constrained to be zero. Competition
for workers among firms guarantees that contractural features make workers
as well off as possible. I follow the dual approach here.
Early work on compensating differentials for unemployment risk took
the worker's objective to be expected income maximization?3 Expected
earnings are the wage while working times the probability of employment, and
the latter is 1.0 minus the probability of unemployment. Therefore, jobs
offering high unemployment prospects must pay higher wages in order to
attract workers and equalize expected utility among them. Implicit contract
theory shows that this approach may be seriously misleading when various
aspects of insurance and risk sharing are considered.29
A sketch of the basic idea is illustrated by a simple example.
Imagine a worker in some activity where the value of production x is
stochastic. Letxbe distributed by the known probability law G(x).
The worker is permanently attached to the activity, but has the option
of not working in any period if his productivity (the realized value of
x) is small enough. Let the nonmarket value of the worker's time be
k, and assume that k is nonstochastic. Thus k is the value of leisure
or of home production. Let u(.) denote the worker's concave utility
function of consumption. Finally, let 6(x) denote an employment indicator
function such that 5(x) =Iwhen the worker is employed in market production
x and 5(x) =0 whenthe worker is unemployed (or employed in the nonmarket
sector),"producing" k.
I propose toanalyze the problem in two steps. First consider a
worker—firm that doesn't trade with anyone else. Then examine the gains
from trade through risk shifting and insurance.






where 0G(k) is the unemployment rate and E(uIcS =1)is a conditional
expectation. Expression (3) provides the simple intuition for compensating
differentials on unemployment risk. Consider two activities, one with a
greater unemployment rate than the other. Then, since the employment rule
implies that E(u(x)15 =1)>u(k),the activity with the larger value of 030
has smaller expected utility at equal average consumption when employed.
A wage premium is necessary to attract any workers. That something might
be awry with this logic is suggested by the fact that e and E(u(x)JtS =1)
are both endogenously determined, presumably by such things as the riski-
ness of the distribution C(x). This is most easily shown when risk is
diversifiable through insurance.
Consider now a situation where there are many firms, each facing
statistically independent risks which can be fully diversified by pooling.
Availability of insurance breaks the personal link between consumption and
production. It allows a worker and firm to form a relationship in which
the firm pays w(x) to employed workers and unemployment compensation
w(x) to its unemployed members, both possibly state dependent.. This is
achieved by shifting productivity risk from workers to risk—neutral
employers or to the market at large by portfolio diversification. Full
risk shifting is equivalent to an actuarially fair Insurance arrangement
and must satisfy a budget constraint: expected income to the insurance
agent equals expected outgo. Thus the implicit contract solves the fol-
lowing constrained maximum problem
(4) Uf[ô(x)u(w(x)) + (1 —(x))u((x)+k)]dG
+ Af[cS(x)x —5(x)w(x)—(1—
withrespect to functions 5(x), w(x) and (x).
State—by—state differentiation of the policy functions in (4) reveals
the following. The equiilbriuin contract equalizes consumption in all
employed states: w(x) =wfor all x for which 5(x) =1.Similarly,31
unemployment compensation equalizes consumption in all unemployed states:
(x) for all x where 6(x) =0.In fact fair insurance implies com-
plete insurance in all states independent of x: w = + k, and the
worker's consumption is guaranteed independent of employment status. These
are all familiar consequences of risk aversion and are sometimes thought
to imply wage rigidity in the optimal contract. However, that is
slightly mistaken. It is more accurate to say that consumption rigidity
is implied, akin to the permanent income hypothesis. Finally, the optimum
employment policy is efficient as before and has 6(x) =1when x k and
6(x) =0when x <k.Complete insurance disassociates productive efficiency
from distribution.
These properties of the optimum contract allow us to write maximum
expected utility as
(5) Uu(+k)+X[(x-k)dGwJ
u( + k) + A[(l -G(k))(E(xlxk) —k)-
fromwhich comparative statics can be derived. Consider an increase in
risk in the sense of a mean preserving spread in the distribution G(x).
Increasing risk changes expected utility in proportion to its effect on
,andexpression (5) suggests that the effect of such a change on
depends on how E(x{xk) is affected. We know from definition that a
conditional mean in increasing in the spread of its parent distribution.
Therefore we conclude that increasing risk raises expected utility because
it increases w. The logic of this paradoxical result, that greater risk
is preferred to less risk, is analogous to option pricing formulas in
finance. The availability of a nonmarket "production" alternative trun—32
cates the distribution of employed states from below. Increasing risk
allows the firm to be more selective in its employment policy, employing
workers with greater frequency in the most productive states, increasing
average output and supporting larger w and w payments.
It must be stressed that the risk—is—good argument applies only to
those shocks that are sufficiently transient and Independent to be diversi-
fied. In that case permanent wealth of a worker is not affected by any
particular realization of x. This suggests that equalizing differences would
only be observed for anticipated undiversifiable risk because those do
imply permanent changes in wealth and therefore in consumption prospects.
Empirical work on this problem is in a surprisingly elementary state
and the few studies that have been done found small wage premiums for
unemployment risk. However, most investigators have not clearly distinguished
between diversifiable and nondiversifiable risk, so all returns are not in.
Nevertheless there are some other broad implications of these models that
are consistent with observation. First, the theory implies that consumption
should be smoothed relative to stochastic realizations. Permanent income
studies of consumption broadly confirm this prediction. Second, the model
implies systematic sorting and assignment of different types of workers to
risk classes. Those workers whose nonmarket uses of time are most valuable
should bear a proportionately greater share of unemployment risks because
it is socially less costly for them to do so. The incidence of unemployment
among various socioeconomic groups is broadly consistent with this prediction.
IV. Selection, Assignment and Productivity
This section sketches how a competitive labor market assigns workers
of different talents to alternative tasks and occupations. The equalizing33
difference function is now defined over productivity attributes of workers
and is closely related to the Ricardian theory of rent (consumption attri-
butes of jobs are ignored in this discussion). Just as different climate,
irrigation, and soil nutrient attributes of agricultural land affect
productivity and therefore value, so too do different ability and other
attributes of workers affect their valuations in a competitive labor market.
One of the problems in Section III showed how this might be addressed by
introducing worker traits directly into production functions.. Then a
variant of Figure 3 applies with W(.) defined over worker traits. The
equilibrium wage—attributes function is an envelope across bid functions
of firms for attributes. Workers are systematically sorted and stratified
to jobs according to their productivity attributes and are matched to
firms according to the intensity with which attributes affect production
of various goods and services.
Such an approach has two limitations: it restricts analysis to
those situations where production functions can be expressed directly in
terms of worker characteristics; and it is easily manageable only when
each firm specializes its choice of personnel to a single. type of worker.
The former is not always possible or meaningful, and the latter is seldom
strictly observed. I therefore outline an alternative model in which the
valuation system on characteristics is the indirect outcome of market
assignments, in the manner of the conventional theory of rent. This
model is better articulated with standard analytical methods, particularly
those used in the theory of international trade, and is also more fruitful
for analyzing the distribution of earnings.1434
Consider a simple economy with n goods and production functions
i
Xj =F(Tii,T21), where Xj is output of good i =1,...,nand T11 and T21
are total input of two labor factors in the production of x1, each measured
in efficiency units. The T's may be given a variety of interpretations
depending on the particular problem to be analyzed, but for present purposes
are two distinct occupations, which themselves are (exogenously) defined
as collections of productive tasks and work activities. Notice that this
formulation preserves a certain additivity: It is the sum of productive
inputs among all workers employed in the production of a particular good
that matters, not how this sum is distributed over different types of
workers in a production unit. Another way of saying it is that there is
a form of perfect quantity—quality substitution among workers in production.
Ignoring hours of work decisions for simplicity, a worker is
completely described by two numbers (t1,t2) where t, j =1,2represents
a worker's productive efficiency in job j, his contribution to if
full time is allocated to that task. I assume for this exposition that
and t2 are endowed for each worker, but differ among them. Then the
absolute scale of t1 and t2 measures a worker's absolute advantage, in each.
activity and the ratio r =t2/t1is an index of comparative advantage on
activity 2 (equivalently, hr indexes comparative advantage in activity 1).
Define a worker type by an index v of the comparative advantage ratio,
r =r(v),with v defined on the unit interval. Then v can be chosen so
that r is ordered from largest to smallest. I assume that there are such
a large number of different types of workers in the sense of v that r&)
is continuous for all practical purposes, so that dr/dy < 0. The total
supply of worker talents is des.cribed in either of two equivalent ways.35
Oneisas a distribution by type v, say n(v)dv, where n is appropriately
scaled to account for differences within type v for absolute advantage or
differences in absolute efficiency units. Another is by a joint distribu-
tion on the random vector (t1,t2) across the entire working population,
say g(t1,t2)dt1dt2. We wish to study how the market assigns workers to
activities, how it partitions these distributions and what those partitions
imply about observable variables.15
It is clear that the optimum assignment of workers to tasks follows
the principle of comparative advantage. An. economy—wide task possibility—
frontier in the T1,T2 planets found byiuaximizingT2 for any given level of
subject to the constraints implied by either n(v) or g(t1,t2). This is
done in exactly the same way that the world production possibility frontier
is derived in the theory of international trade with many countries.
Each worker specializes in the activity in which he exhibits comparative
advantage and potential skill in the activity to which he Is not assigned
remains latent and unutilized. The assignment is ordered on v: a given
point on the task possibility frontier is supported by a critical value
v' such that persons with v >v*are assigned to T2, those with v <v*
are assigned to T1, and those for whom v =vare assigned by a random
device. The frontier itself completely describes relevant factor endowments
in the economy, which in turn define the conditions of supply of all goods
Xj—— theproduction possibility set of outputs in the economy at large.
Finally, demand conditions for goods and services determine the general
equilibrium, including the assignments of workers to various firms and
industries and the precise menu of goods actually produced.36
Since it is not immediately relevant to the purposes at hand, I
omit details of how the complete equilibrium in the economy is determined.
What is crucial is that this equilibrium is supported by a maximumproblem
and a competitive labor market. General equilibrium determines linear
prices p1 and p2 on the inputs T1 and T2 that maximize the total value of
inputs in the economy. A plane tangent to the task possibility frontier defines
thse prices, and its gradient can be thought of as piece rates for personal
output in each activity. Each worker faces these prices parametrically
and decides whether to supply his labor to or T2. Given the worker's
endowed values of t1 and t2, the alternative that maximizes income is
chosen. Income potential in activity j is simply j for j =1,2.
Define p =p1/p2
as the relative price. Then maximization of earnings is
equivalently described by the rule: choose or T2 as r(v)p. The
equality r (v*)p definesthe criticalvalue of v* discussed above..
An alternative description of the optimum assignment is represented
as a linear partition of the joint distribution g(t1,t2) shown in Figure 5.
Each person is uniquely described by a point in the t1,t2 plane. The
ellipses in Figure 5 show the probability contours in the overall working
population, the level sets of g(t1,t2). The linear function t2 =Pt1
serves as the dividing line in the optimal and market assignmentof workers
to activities. All those whose skill endowment point lies above the line
choose activity 2 because their incomes are largest there. All those whose
skill endowment point lies below the line choose activity 1. Notice that
as p rises, a margin of workers (it would be represented by a wedge—shaped
area itt Figure 5) find it optimal to reassign themselves to activity1
rather than 2 because their relative income prospects change. Noticealso37
that for small changes in p most people are inframarginal and continue
using the same skill. This is very similar in spirit to what happened
in the model of Section II.
The contours in Figure 5 are drawn on the assumption that t1 and
are positively correlated in the population, so that a person who is
very productive in activity 2 is also likely to be very productive in
activity 1 as well. Positive correlation signals the presence of absolute
advantage and suggests a factor structure interpretation of t. which places
substantial weight on a single dimension, such as general intelligence or
I.Q. However, it is entirely possible that the correlation is negative.
Then the ellipses would have been negatively inclined, and a person who
was very good at one activity would more than likely be worse than average
in the other. In that case absolute advantage is not important. A factor
structure interpretation of t3 suggests at least two distinct factors in
which skills in one activity load heavily on one factor and skills in the
other activity load heavily on a distinctly different factor. The ellipses
in Figure 5 have been drawn so that the marginal variance of t2 in g(t1,t2)
exceeds the marginal variance ot t1. This may be interpreted in terms of
the inherent difficulty of performing the two activities. Smaller variance
in activity 1 suggests that just about everyone achieves more or less the
same amountofuseful output if they devote themselves to that activity.
In that sense activity 2 in Figure 5 is inherently more difficult and offers
greater scope for talent and ability to stand out and make its mark.
Given the shape of g(t1,t2) market selectivity implies some interesting
productivity calculations in response to relative price changes. For example,
suppose t1 and t2 are positively correlated and p increases. Then the38
average personal productivity of people observed in both occupations would
tend to rise: the average person observed in T2 initially exhibits absolute
advantage in both, and some of these persons switch over to T1. On the
other hand, were the correlation between latent skills negative, an
increase in p raises average productivity of workers remaining in T2,
because those finding it advantageous to switch from to T1 are drawn
from the lower tail of the conditional (marginal) t2 distribution. Those
making the switch are of lower average productivity In than workers who
initially chose it, so average personal productivity observed in
decreases.
Equivalent statements can be made about the observed distribution
of earnings in each activity. These statements are readily obtained from
the fact that both the latent and actual income distributions are simple
linear transforms of the distribution of g(t1,t2) due to the linearity of
prices p1 and p2. This provides a very powerful basis for analyzing the
cross—sectional distribution of earnings, both between activities and
among them, from the relationship y =max(y1,y2), where y is observed
earnings independent of activity choice and y. is earning opportunities of
a person in activity j. Space limitations preclude a complete development
of those Ideas here. Suffice it to say that the actual choices are made
optimally. This implies selectivity bias in between—activity earnings
comparisons. Average earnings observed by those who chose T1 are unlikely
to be an unbiased estimate of average earnings prospects available to those
who chose T2 had they somehow been assigned to T1 instead. The converse
also applies. Again, these statements are very similar in spirit to the
sorting implications of revealed preference discussed in Section II.39
V. Ability Sorting: Applications
Two applications illustrate the ideas in Section IV. The first
is theoretical and the second is empirical.
A. Sorting by Latent Characteristics.16
Given the general flavor of this essay, it is perhaps noteworthy
that the general outline of equilibrium in Section IV made little or no
reference to worker characteristics or traits. That deficiency is
remedied here. It is shown that the selectivity aspects of optimal assign-
ments imply corresponding sorting of workers by those characterisitcs which
influence abilities and comparative advantage.
The number t is a direct measure of a worker's talent in activity
j. The vector of talents and prices Pj were seen to be all that was
necessary to study market assignments and income distribution. Further
development is possible by writing the determinants of personal talent
in an activity in terms of another set of latent factors (in the sense
of factor analysis in statistics), according to "production functions"
Here Z1,. ..,Z are a relatively small set of
latent factors which determine ability in a given activity, such as
physical strength, manual dexterity, verbal abilities, analytical
abilities, and so forth. As written, the Z's influence potential output
in all activities, though the marginal product of any Z may differ among
activities, as shown by the index on production function&.Thisis
clearest in the case of a proper factor model, when is linear as in Z..;
= where are constants.
A worker is endowed with particular values of attributes Z and
is completely described by a point on the vector (Z1,.. ,Z). All workers40
together are described by a distribution over (Z1,... ,Z), which in con-
junction with the production functions relating the Z's toti's lead to
the joint density g(t1,t2) extensively utilized above. As a consequence
the equilibrium analysis of Section IV applies intact, and the pricing
system that supports it induces an implicit pricing scheme on the Z's
through the relations Yj = Substituting the production relations
into these expressions in the linear case results in y. = where
3 i
4ij = canbe regarded as the implicit prices of Z1 in activity j.
Notice that the implicit prices on any given characteristic Z are
distinct across activities. There are no exploitable arbitrage opportunities
that equalize implicit prices across different types of jobs in the economy.
This is a fundamental implication of the assumption that the Vs themselves
are not direct objects of choice by firms and do not directly enter into
a firm's production function. Viewing the linear relations between the
Vs and y.'s as a factor structure suggests interpreting as a "factor
loading." However, the analogy is not complete because factor loadings
vary from job to job (i.e., across j).
Nevertheless, systematic sorting of activities according to Z is
strongly implied by the model. For example, consider Figure 6, which is
specialized to two underlying factors (m =2)and four activities (j =l,...,4).
Given lj and 2j' the dashed intersecting lines show those combinations
of and Z2 that result in a dollar's worth of earnings in activity j, for
j =l,...,4.A person with an endowment at point A makes the most money in
activity 1 and is therefore assigned to that activity. The rays through the
origin are defined by intersections of consecutive dashed lines, and it
follows from homogeneity of the linear &productionfunctions that41
all individuals whose endowment lies between the vertical axis and the first
(steepest) ray optimally choose activity 1, by exactly the same logic. The
rays therefore define the optimal partition of the joint distribution of
the Z's across activities. There is systematic sorting of characteristics
and worker types to activities. Notice that the relative slopes of the
dashed lines in Figure 6 depend on relative factor prices Thus
income prospects in activity 1 weight attribute Z2 much more heavily than
Z1 and vice—versa for activity 4. Activities 2 and 3 weigh both attributes
more equally. Those individuals who are heavily endowed with one attribute
are more likely to be found in the extreme activities (1 or 4), while those
with. more balanced endowments are more likely to be found in the middle
activities (2 or 3). Again, sstemátic selection of persons by latent
characteristics is. the rule rather than the exception.
B. Educational Selection'7
The rate of return to schooling is the fundamental concept in the
economics of education. The basic idea is simple. Suppose a person takes
s years of schooling and enters the market thereafter. Let V(s) represent
the discounted present value, as of some early age, of future earnings
prospects given that s years are completed. Here earnings include income
during the schooling period (with deductions for direct costs) as well as
during periods of full participation in the work force. The person's incre-
mental rate of return to schooling is the gradient V'(s). A major empirical
task is to calculate the function V(s). This is complicated by the fact that
we never observe a path not taken, and only one value of s is realized for
any given person. Therefore, V(s) must be imputed by a "counterfactual"42
comparison of income streams between people who stopped school at different
levels, raising possibilities of bias due to interpersonal differences in
returns and costs of schooling.
Public policy interest in these calculations rests on cost—benefit
analysis. of interventions, such as subsidies, which induce young people to
undertake more schooling than they otherwise would. If we were confident
that actual schooling choices were randomly determined, then imputing V(s)
from interpersonal differences in earnings would map out the average social
rate of return. However, there are strong reasons for believing that
school completion choices are systematic: rational decision requires
choosing s to equate the marginal rate of return with the personal rate
of discount. Still if family wealth (interpersonal differences in discount
factors) was the only constraint on individual choice. interpersonal
estimates of V(s) would yield excellent approximations of average schooling
prospects for a random person in the population. This is not the case if
private rates of return systematically differ among people.
Early investigations of schooling returns clearly recognized possible
problems of "ability bias," that those who continue school are likely to be
more able in some sense than those who stop at lower levels. Thus selection
and admissions policies of colleges are contingent on adequate high school
performance, and colleges themselves are highly stratified by abilities of
students. Nevertheless, most studies have adopted a very narrow view of
ability—as—IQ which, by the logic of section IV, implicitly restricts
attention to questions of absolute advantage and ignores comparative advan-
tage. Since different levels and types of schooling are closely associated
with different occupations and work activities, it seemsevidentthat43
a priori restrictions of absolute advantage or disadvantage are too con-
fining for the problem. Would a person who was very successful as a lawyer
have been a very successful plumber as well (and vice—versa)? Or is it more
likely that the verbal skills that make for successful lawyering would not
have as much value in the plumbing profession, for which mechanical
abilities are more important? In short, it seems likely that the constructions
in Figures 5 and 6 apply to these choices and that individuals are sorted
across occupations and school completion levels by latent characteristics
(talents) which produce comparative as well as absolute advantage.
The apparatus of section IV can be applied directly to this problem
when school completion levels are discrete rather than continuous. Thus
let V be the present discounted value of earnings oL a person for schooling
level i, with i =1,...,ii.Thenthe population at large is described by
a random vector (V1, V2, ...,v)in the sense of the distribution g(.)
used above. Each person chooses the value of i which maximizes V, that is
the distributions of V and i actually observed are generated by the rule
V =max(V ,..., V)foreach person, leading to partitions much like
1 n
Figures 5 and 6.
My study with Willis examined the choice of continuing schooling
beyond high school compared with stopping after high school graduation, a
special case in which ii2.This restriction of the choice set was
dictated by limitations of available econometric technology which currently
is best suited to binomial rather than multinomial choices. We found
substantial evidence of ability sorting in these two classes, though
necessary adjustments to simple rate of return calculations were relatively
small. More interestingly, when observed earnings patterns in the two44
classes were purged of selection bias there was strong indication of the
presence of comparative advantage and negative correlation in underlying
talents. Those who entered college would have earned less had they
stopped upon high school graduation than those who actually stopped.
Had high school completers continued on to college, they would have
earned less than those who actually found it in their best interests to
enter college. We also discovered that prospective personal financial gains
from college entrance were important determinants of the decision to attend,
though family background and costs were important considera-
tions as well. Studies of this sort have to be replicated on a broader
scale and on a variety of data sources to get a more complete picture of
the practical importance of these effects.
VI. Conclusions
I hope my exposition and examples illustrate both the simplicity and
broad range of applicability of equalizing differences in labor markets.
Much more work. remains to be done. Existing analysis of valuation of worker
traits and characteristics and the assignment of workers to firms seems to
me to be a weak sister in this enterprise. A main function of labor markets
is to solve a type of marriage problem, to match a particular worker to a
particular position in a particular firm. While the framework I set forth
above does this in a general way, it ignores productivity interactions among
workers within firms, how a specific worker fits a niche in the enterprise
and becomes a proper member of a productive team. A good deal of the search
and turnover activity we observe among young workers probably is attributable
to this kind of matching. While much interesting recent research45
on matching hasbeendone, most of it is partial equilibrium and conceals
the larger picture of assignments in the market as a whole. Finally, we
are a long way toward understanding how disequilibrium affects mobility
decisions and how movements provoked by disequilibrium can be distinguished
empirically from equilibrium mobility that naturally arises over the
life—cycle through skill and job upgrading and reassignment.FOOTNOTES
*1 am indebted to Nasser Saidi for the opportunity to present this
material and for his substantial contributions over the years
to many of the ideas in this paper. The National Science Foundation provided
financial support. As will be apparent, my bibliography is highly selected,
but more complete citations are found in the references listed.
1The presence of nonearned income modifies the budget constraint in
an obvious way and is therefore omitted. In that case, nonzero income
effects in preferences imply systematic sorting by wealth, along the lines
indicated below for differences in taste.
2Determination of firm size and related questions are ignored
because they are not directly relevant for the problem at hand: the distri-
bution f(s) incorporates the exogenous distribution of firms by size, but
each firm's scale decision could be incorporated without great difficulty.
3mis example has been carefully chosen so that the wage ratio
enters both supply and demand, and is not general. More typically the wage
difference is relevant for workers, while the ratio is sufficient for
firms. Clearly, no great issues of principal are involved here.
4it is straightforward to extend this to multivariate (vector)
attributes: see Rosen [1974] for detailed elaboration. Mas—Colell [1975]
proves an existence theorem for models of this type.
5My exposition is based on Rosen [1981] and Thaler and Rosen [1975].
Useful surveys of this and other issues are found in Linnerooth [1979] and
Jones—Lee [1976].6See especially Becker [1957]. Also, Arrow [1972].
draw mainly on the study by Antos and Rosen [1975]. Several
other studies along similar lines appear in the literature; e.g., Chambers
[1978].
8Existence of substantial wage differentials between public and
private schools confirms this interpretation. Racial mixing of students
may produce social tension that creates nonlinearitles in the wage regres-
sion, but this remains to be investigated.
9See Rosen [1972] for elaboration.
10
MacDonald 1 1982] develops a major extenioninwhich. learning about
workers' latent talents allows more efficient work. assignments as experience
is accumulated. See also Ross, Taubman and Wachter 11981].
11These studies are surveyed in Rosen 11977].
12The basic references are Azariadis [19753 and Baily 11974]. Ily
account follows my ownwork(Rosen [1983]) atid Nortensen 11983],
'3See Hall [1972] for example.Harrisand Todaro 119.7QJ present
an especially interesting application to underdeveloped countries..
Abowd and Ashenfelter 11981] pursue this line to its logical limit.
14Roy [1952] pioneered this approach., though. see the related effort
by Tinbergen [1959]. That work was rediscovered and elaborated in recent
years by Rosen [1978] and Sattinger j1980]. Heckinan and Sedlacek .11981]
develop econometric methods suitable for these models.
15The distribution of latent talents g(.) is the fundamental prirnative
and readily generalizes to an arbitrary number of work activities, Theordered distribution n(v) does not usefully generalize to more than two
skills, but has certain expository virtues.
16
The ideas in this section were first formulated in a neglected
article by Mandeibrot [1962]. Welch [1969] takes a much different approach
in which the Vs are direct factors of production in place of the T's.
discussion is based on Willis and Rosen [1978].REFERENCES
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